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Abstract—Learning-enabled components (LECs) are widely
used in cyber-physical systems (CPS) since they can handle the
uncertainty and variability of the environment and increase
the level of autonomy. However, it has been shown that LECs
such as deep neural networks (DNN) are not robust and
adversarial examples can cause the model to make a false
prediction. The paper considers the problem of efficiently
detecting adversarial examples in LECs used for regression in
CPS. The proposed approach is based on inductive conformal
prediction and uses a regression model based on variational
autoencoder. The architecture allows to take into consideration
both the input and the neural network prediction for detecting
adversarial, and more generally, out-of-distribution examples.
We demonstrate the method using an advanced emergency
braking system implemented in an open source simulator for
self-driving cars where a DNN is used to estimate the distance
to an obstacle. The simulation results show that the method can
effectively detect adversarial examples with a short detection
delay.
Keywords-adversarial example detection, inductive confor-
mal prediction, VAE based regression, self-driving vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of learning-enabled components (LECs) such as
deep neural networks (DNNs) is on the rise in many classes
of cyber-physical systems (CPS). Semi-autonomous and
autonomous vehicles, in particular, are applications where
LECs play a significant role. Although DNNs can increase
the level of the autonomy by handling the uncertainty
and variability of the environment, multiple studies have
shown that DNNs are not robust. For example, they are
vulnerable to examples with small specially human-crafted
perturbations in the input that cause false predictions [1],
[2].
LECs rely on design-time data-driven training to learn
how to operate in unstructured and dynamic environments.
However, LECs must be deployed and operate in a real
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system and the input data may be different than the data used
for training and testing. Adversarial examples, in particular,
can cause wrong predictions and impact system safety [3].
Adversarial example detection for CPS must have a low false
alarm rate while being computational efficient for real-time
monitoring.
Recently, there have been many efforts to defend against
adversarial examples especially in the context of classifica-
tion. Autoencoder based methods, such as [4], [5], utilize the
reconstruction error or the reconstruction accuracy to detect
adversarial examples. The autoencoders learn and encode the
properties of the training data with latent representations. If
a test example is from the same distribution as the training
set, we expect a small reconstruction error. The work in [6]
presents an approach which aims to map the in-distribution
input data into a hypersphere of minimum volume charac-
terized by center c and radius R. The adversarial examples
are expected to be mapped to points out of the hypersphere.
Typically, existing methods do not take into consideration
the dynamical behavior.
In our previous work [7], we developed an approach
which leverages inductive conformal prediction [8], [9] and
inductive anomaly detection [10] for out-of-distribution de-
tection in learning-enabled CPS. The detection algorithm is
based on a variational autoencoder (VAE) which is designed
independently of the perception LEC, and the approach
considers only the input data. Taking into account the
predicted output can be beneficial for detection of adversarial
examples especially since they are crafted so that a small
perturbation of the inputs causes a large change in the output.
Instead of training the regression and VAE model used
for detection independently, this paper uses a VAE-based
regression model which integrates the regression model into
the VAE and takes into account the predicted output for
adversarial detection.
The main contribution of the paper is an approach for de-
tection of adversarial examples for regression LECs in CPS
based on inductive conformal anomaly detection. In order to
take into consideration the output of the regression LEC, the
proposed approach employs a VAE-based regression model
which is learned jointly combining the VAE and regressor
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by conditioning the latent representation of the VAE on the
target variable of the regressor. The inductive conformal
anomaly detection is based on the VAE-based regression
model and can be performed efficiently for high-dimensional
inputs.
Another contribution is the empirical evaluation of the
approach using an advanced emergency braking system
(AEBS) implemented in CARLA [11], an open source
simulator for self-driving cars. The AEBS uses a perception
LEC to detect the nearest front obstacle and estimate the
distance from the host vehicle based on the images captured
by an onboard camera. The distance estimated by the LEC
is used by a reinforcement learning controller together with
the vehicles velocity to compute the desired braking in order
to safely stop the vehicle. The fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [2] is used to generate adversarial examples for
the perception LEC which cause large error in the distance
estimation and result to a collision. It should be noted that
although such attacks may be not physically realizable, they
provide a framework to analyze the robustness of the LEC.
The evaluation results show that the approach can detect
such adversarial examples effectively with a short detection
delay.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces system model and formulates the problem. Sec-
tion III describes the VAE-based regression model and the
detection algorithm based in inductive conformal anomaly
detection. Section IV presents the evaluation results using
the AEBS. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A simplified CPS architecture is shown in Fig. 1. The per-
ception component observes and interprets the environment
and feeds the information into the controller which, possibly
using additional sensors (feedback from the plant), applies
an action to the physical plant in order to achieve some task.
In responding to the action, the state of the physical plant
changes and the environment is observed and interpreted
again to continue the system operation. LECs are extensively
used for perception and control tasks in CPS in order to
increase the level of autonomy.
Environment
End-to-end control
Perception Control PhysicalPlant
Figure 1. Simplified CPS control architecture [7].
Perception and control may be implemented using LECs
(e.g., neural networks). An LEC can be designed using
learning techniques such as supervised, unsupervised, and
reinforcement learning. It is assumed that the LECs are
successfully trained and evaluation of training and testing
errors is satisfactory. However, adversarial examples with
small input perturbations may cause the LECs to generate
outputs with large errors and impact the safety of the system.
The problem considered in this paper is detecting effi-
ciently adversarial examples. During the system operation,
the inputs arrive one by one and an adversarial example can
cause large prediction error. The objective of the detection
is to efficiently detect if the LEC input is adversarial. It
should be noted that although such attacks may be not
physically realizable, they provide a framework to analyze
the robustness of the LEC.
III. VARIATIONAL AUTOENCODER FOR REGRESSION
AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES DETECTION
The detection algorithm proposed in this paper extends the
work in [7] by using a VAE-based regression model [12].
The method is based on an LEC architecture which inte-
grates the regression model into the VAE and uses inductive
conformal anomaly detection [10].
A. Variational Autoencoder for Regression
A Variational Autoencoder (VAE) is a generative model
whose encodings distribution is regularised during the train-
ing in order to ensure that its latent space has good properties
allowing the generation of new data [13]. The objective is
to model the relationship between the observation x and the
low-dimensional latent variable z. The architecture presented
in [12] integrates a regression model into the generative
model to disentangle the regression target variable from the
latent space. The architecture of the VAE-based regression
model is shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2. VAE-based regression model [12].
Similar to a traditional VAE, the encoder attempts to
represent the input on the latent space using a Gaussian
distribution p(z). Instead of using a single Gaussian prior,
the VAE-based regression model conditions the prior on the
regression target variable c such that the new prior p(z|c),
called latent generator, can be used to sample a specific
latent representation for a given target variable c. On the
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other branch of the architecture, a regression network q(c|x)
is used to inference the target variable and its uncertainty.
The loss function is defined as
L(θ, φc, φz;x) =−DKL(qφc(c|x)||p(c))
+ Ez∼qφz (z|x)[log pθ(x|z)]
− Ec∼qφc (c|x)[DKL(qφz (z|x)||p(z|c))],
where θ, φz and φc are the neural network parameters. The
first term regularizes the prediction of c with a ground-
truth prior p(c). The second term is the model fit trying
to reconstruct the input from the latent representations. The
third term is the KL divergence between the approximate
posterior and the regression-specific prior p(z|c). Both the
VAE and the regression model can be jointly trained as a
single network and the target variable is disentangled from
the latent space.
B. Adversarial Examples for Regression Model
A common approach to generate adversarial examples is
the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [2], which computes
an adversarial input by adding a small perturbation in the
direction of the gradient. Instead of using this method to
make the target network to misclassify the input, in our
work, this FGSM is utilized to cause a large error in the
output of the regression network.
For a given input x and a target output ytarget, the neural
network output is the regression estimation c = f(x). The
objective is to change x to x˜ such that the error between
ytarget and f(x˜) is minimized. This can be achieved by
considering the cost function J(x˜, ytarget) = |f(x˜)− ytarget|2
for generating the adversarial examples.
C. Adversarial Detection
1) Conformal prediction: Our method is based on induc-
tive conformal prediction (ICP) [8]. The core idea of the
method is to compute a nonconformity measure defined by
a function A that assigns a value as nonconformity score
indicating how different a test example from the training data
set. A large nonconformity score corresponds to a strange
example with respect to the training data set. The original
training set {(x1, y1), . . . , (xl, yl)} is split into a proper
training set {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} and a calibration set
{(xm+1, ym+1), . . . , (xl, yl)}. For each calibration example,
the nonconformity scores αm+1, . . . , αl are precomputed
relative to the proper training set. For a test example
(x′k, y
′
k), the nonconformity score α
′
k is computed using the
same way relative to the proper training set and the p-value
is defined as the fraction of calibration examples that have
nonconformity scores greater than or equal to the α′k
pk =
|{i = m+ 1, . . . , l} |αi ≥ α′k|
l −m . (1)
If the p-value is smaller than a predefined threshold  ∈
(0, 1), the test example can be classified as a conformal
anomaly. Using a single p-value for detecting the anomaly
will make the detector oversensitive. The robustness of the
detector can be considerably improved if multiple p-values
are used. In [14], it is shown that if the test examples are
independent and identically distributed (IID), the p-values
are independent and uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Further,
a martingale test is used to test the hypothesis that the p-
values are independent and uniformly distributed, and the
martingale value is used as an indicator for the unusual test
example [14]. In [15], the simple mixture martingale is used
which is defined as
M =
∫ 1
0
N∏
i=1
p−1i d. (2)
M will grow only if there are many small p-values in the
sequence. More details about the martingales can be found
in [15].
The main idea in our approach is to use the generative
VAE model to generate multiple examples sampling from
the learned latent space probability distribution. The samples
which are similar to the input are IID and can be used
to generate p-values that are independent and uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. Then, the martingale can be used to test
this hypothesis and detect if the test example comes from
the training data set distribution.
2) Nonconformity measure and adversarial detection al-
gorithm: In [7], the reconstruction error (squared error
between the input x and the generated output xˆ) of the VAE
model is used as the nonconformity measure
α = AVAE(x, xˆ) = ||x− xˆ||2.
In this paper, we use the same nonconformity measure based
on the output of the VAE-based regression model which
integrates the regression model and the VAE (Fig. 2).
During the offline phase, the training set
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xl, yl)} is split into a proper training
set {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} and a calibration set
{(xm+1, ym+1), . . . , (xl, yl)}. The VAE-based regression
model is trained by utilizing the proper training data set. For
each example in the calibration data set, the nonconformity
score is precomputed using the nonconformity measure
AVAE.
At runtime, a sequence of test inputs (x′1, . . . , x
′
t, . . .) is
processed one-by-one. Consider the input x′t. The method
samples from the posterior distribution of the latent space
to generate N new examples xˆ′t,1, . . . , xˆ
′
t,N , and the non-
conformity score α′t,k and the corresponding p-value for
each generated example xˆ′t,k are computed using AVAE and
Eq. (1). Since the generated examples are IID, the p-values
(pt,1, . . . , pt,N ) are independent and uniformly distributed
in [0, 1]. Therefore, the martingale in Eq. (2) can be used
for detection. The martingale denoted by Mt has a large
value if there are many small p-values in the sequence
(pt,1, . . . , pt,N ) which indicates an out-of-distribution input.
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In order to robustly detect when the martingale becomes
consistently large, [7] uses a stateful CUSUM detector to
generate alarms for out-of-distribution inputs by keeping
track of the historical information of the martingale values.
The detector is defined as S1 = 0 and St = max(0, St−1 +
Mt−1−δ), where δ prevents St from increasing consistently
when the inputs are in the same distribution as the training
data. An alarm is raised whenever St is greater than a
threshold St > τ which can be optimized using empirical
data [16]. Typically, after an alarm the test is reset with
St+1 = 0. Algorithm 1 describes the steps of the method.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial examples detection using the VAE-
based regression model
Input: Input training set {(x1, y1), . . . , (xl, yl)}, test exam-
ples (x′1, . . . , x
′
t, . . .), number of calibration examples
l −m, number of examples to be sampled N , stateful
detector threshold τ and parameter δ
Output: Output boolean variable Anomt, regression result
ct
Offline:
1: Split the training set {(x1, y1), . . . , (xl, yl)} into the
proper training set {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} and cali-
bration set {(xm+1, ym+1), . . . , (xl, yl)}
2: Train a VAE-based regression model f(·) using the
proper training set and get the corresponding noncon-
formity measure AVAE(·)
3: for j = m+ 1 to l do
4: Sample xˆj using the trained VAE
5: αj = AVAE(xj , xˆj)
6: end for
Online:
7: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
8: for k = 1 to N do
9: Sample xˆ′t,k using the trained VAE
10: α′t,k = AVAE(x
′
t, xˆ
′
t,k)
11: pt,k =
|{i=m+1,...,l} |αi≥α′t,k|
l−m
12: end for
13: Mt =
∫ 1
0
∏N
k=1 p
−1
t,k d
14: if t = 1 then
15: St = 0
16: else
17: St = max(0, St−1 +Mt−1 − δ)
18: end if
19: Anomt ← St > τ
20: ct = f(x
′
t)
21: end for
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate the adversarial detection method using an
advanced emergency braking system (AEBS) implemented
using CARLA [11]. The experiments reported use CARLA
0.9.5 on a 16-core i7 desktop with 32 GB RAM and a single
RTX 2080 GPU with 8 GB video memory.
A. Experimental Setup
A typical architecture (Fig. 3) and its desirable behavior
(Fig. 4) of the AEBS are presented in [7]. The objective of
the AEBS is to detect an obstacle and apply appropriate
brake force in order to avoid a potential collision. The
initial velocity of the host vehicle is v0 and the initial
distance between the host car and the obstacle is d0. A
perception LEC receives images captured by an on-board
camera, detects the nearest front obstacle on the road, and
estimates the distance. The estimated distance together with
the velocity of the host vehicle are fed to a reinforcement
learning controller whose objective is to generate the braking
force for safely stopping the vehicle between Lmin and
Lmax.
Perception RL
Control Vehicle
Camera Distance Brake
Velocity
Figure 3. Advanced emergency braking system architecture [7].
d0 LminLmax 0
v0
Figure 4. Illustration of advanced emergency braking system [7].
In order to simulate realistic scenarios, the initial velocity
v0 is uniformly sampled between 90 km/h and 100 km/h,
and the initial distance d0 is based on the camera range
in CARLA and is approximately 100 m. The reinforcement
learning controller is trained using the DDPG algorithm [17]
with 1000 episodes and reward function which aims to stop
the vehicle between Lmin = 1 m and Lmax = 3 m. It should
be noted is that the sampling period used in the simulation is
∆t = 1/20 s. The reinforcement learning controller is used
only for simulation of the closed loop system and does not
affect the proposed approach. Details about the design of
the reinforcement learning controller can be found in [18].
B. LEC Training
The data set for the perception and detector training con-
sists of 8160 images obtained by varying the initial distance
d0, initial velocity v0 and precipitation. As described in
III, the VAE and the regression network are jointly trained
using the VAE-based regression model implemented as a
convolutional neural network (CNN).
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In the VAE-based regression model, the input
firstly passes through four convolutional layers of
32/64/128/256 × (5 × 5) filters with ELU activations and
2 × 2 max-pooling, and one fully connected layer of 1568
units with ELU activation. Then, the extracted features
are fed into a fully connected layer with 1024 units. The
regressor shares the convolutional layers and also has two
fully connected layers with 256/1 units. After the regressor,
two fully connected layers of 256/1024 are used to yield
distance-specific latent representations. The decoder has
symmetric deconvolutional layers.
A simple two-phase learning schedule is employed with
initial searching learning rate η = 10−4 for 250 epochs, and
subsequently fine-tuning η = 10−5 for 100 epochs. After
the training, the mean absolute error of the perception LEC
for training and testing are 0.32 m and 0.40 m respectively.
In addition, multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) [19] is im-
plemented to seek a low-dimensional representation of the
latent space of the VAE. Fig. 5 shows the 2D representations
of the latent space. From the plots, see that the dimension
related to the distance is disentangled from the latent space.
A closed-loop simulation run is shown in Fig. 7. Ini-
tially, the distance between the host and the lead car is
98.03 m, and the velocity of the host car is 96.95 km/h
(= 26.93 m/s). After 140 steps or 7.0 s, the host vehicle
stops at 1.83 m from the lead car.
In-distribution
Adversarial
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ground truth distance(m)
Figure 5. 2D latent representations estimated by VAE-based regression
model.
C. Adversarial Examples
The FGSM is used to generate adversarial examples for
the perception LEC. For a given input image xt, the neural
network output is the estimated distance ct = dt = f(xt).
The objective is to modify xt by a small step  = 0.02
in the direction that minimizes the loss to x˜t such that the
predicted distance is close to the target value ytarget. In our
experiment, we set ytarget = 100 m. The perception module
predicts a large distance even when the car is very close to
a stopped lead car. A comparison of the original image and
the adversarial image is shown in Fig. 6a and 6c.
(a) Original image (b) Reconstructed original im-
age
(c) Attacked image (d) Reconstructed attacked im-
age
Figure 6. Comparison of original image, image with attack and their
reconstructed images.
D. Simulation Results
In order to analyze the performance of the detection
method, we generate multiple simulation episodes which
contain normal and adversarial examples. Adversarial exam-
ples are inserted in the simulation in a time step uniformly
sampled from {20, 21, . . . , 60}.
To illustrate the approach, we compare two episodes and
plot the ground truth and predicted distance to the lead
stopped car, the velocity of the host car, the p-values and
the S-value of the CUSUM detector (computed using the
logarithm of Mt). We use N = 10 for the number of the
examples generated by the VAE and δ = 12, τ = 80 for
the parameters of the CUSUM detector. Since Mt becomes
very large, we choose to use logMt to show the results.
The normal case is shown in Fig 7. The p-values are
randomly distributed between 0 and 1, and the martingale
is small indicating the inputs are in distribution. An episode
with adversarial examples is shown in Fig 8. The adversar-
ial example starts at 1.20 s trying to cause the regression
network to predict a larger distance than the actual one.
The error starts to increase and reaches almost 20 m. The
controller is misled by the perception LEC and does not stop
the car in time which collides with the lead car (velocity is
5
greater than 0 when ground truth distance comes to 0). The
p-values become smaller and the detector indicates the test
inputs are not from the same distribution as the training data
set. The delay for detection is smaller than 10 frames or 0.5 s
(the sampling rate is 20 Hz).
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Figure 7. Episode with normal input examples.
We plot the 2D representations of the latent space gener-
ated by VAE using one episode of adversarial examples in
Fig. 5. Since the latent space is conditioned by the regression
prediction, the latent representations of the adversarial exam-
ples lie on regions of the space that correspond to different
predictions of the regression network. While reconstructing
the input for an adversarial example, the VAE generates
the new examples from such a region. For example, an
image reflecting a small distance is mapped to the region
indicating a large distance for an adversarial example. Thus,
the reconstructed image is sampled from the wrong region
and reflects a large distance, and therefore, the reconstruction
error or nonconformity score is large. We compare the
original image, adversarial example, and their corresponding
reconstructed images in Fig. 6.
We also evaluate the approach for 100 normal episodes
and 100 adversarial episodes by considering different values
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
Simulation step
D
is
ta
nc
e(
m
) Ground truth distance
Predicted distance
0
10
20
Pr
ed
ic
tio
n
er
ro
r(
m
)
0
10
20
30
V
el
oc
ity
(m
/
s)
0
0.5
1
p
va
lu
e
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
50
100
Time (s)
S
Figure 8. Episode with adversarial examples.
of N . We run each episode and if an alarm is raised, we
stop the simulation, and we check if the alarm is false. We
compute the detection delay as the number of frames from
the adversarial example corresponding to the alarm raised.
Table I shows the false alarms and average delay for different
N , δ and τ . Since the p-values for the adversarial examples
are almost 0, the number of the false alarms is very small
and the detection delay is smaller than 10 frames or 0.5 s.
Table I
VAE-BASED DETECTION.
Parameters
(N, δ, τ)
False positive False negative Average delay(frames)
5, 6, 6 0/100 0/100 1.0
5, 7, 23 0/100 0/100 4.0
10, 10, 62 0/100 0/100 4.0
10, 12, 80 0/100 0/100 6.0
20, 18, 120 0/100 0/100 3.0
20, 20, 280 0/100 0/100 9.0
E. Computational Efficiency
The VAE-based regression model can predict the target
variable and compute the nonconformity score in real-time
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without storing training data. Table II reports the minimum
(min), first quartile (Q1), second quartile or median (Q2),
third quartile (Q3), and maximum (max) of (1) the execu-
tion times of the LECs in AEBS and (2) the execution times
of the VAE-based detectors for different values of N .
Since the VAE-based detection uses N examples in each
time step, the execution time is proportional to the number
of examples generated N . The execution times are much
smaller than the sampling time (50 ms in AEBS, and thus,
the methods can be used for real-time out-of-distribution
detection.
Table II
EXECUTION TIMES.
N
min
(ms)
Q1
(ms)
Q2
(ms)
Q3
(ms)
max
(ms)
AEBS N/A 3.49 3.86 3.93 3.98 4.22
VAE
5 18.90 18.96 18.99 19.02 19.08
10 37.89 37.96 37.99 38.04 38.10
20 76.32 76.47 76.52 76.71 77.32
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented a detection method for ad-
versarial examples in learning-enabled CPS. The method
is based on inductive conformal prediction and uses a
VAE-based regression model to predict the target variable
and compute the nonconformity of new inputs relative to
the training set. The evaluation is based on an AEBS
implemented in an open source simulator for self-driving
cars. FGSM is used to generate adversarial examples. The
results demonstrate that the method can efficiently detect
adversarial examples with a short detection delay. Future
work includes detection of physically realizable attacks,
comparing this new approach with other adversarial detec-
tion methods to study into the benifit of taking the output
into consideration, and also investigating the generation of
adversarial examples that are not detectable by the approach.
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